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Abstract 
In the US, defense R&D share of GDP has decreased significantly since 1960. To analyze 
the implications on economic growth and welfare, we develop an R&D-based growth model that 
features the commonly discussed crowding-out and spillover effects of defense R&D on civilian 
R&D. The model also captures the important effects of defense technology on (a) national 
security and (b) aggregate productivity via the spin-off effect resembling consumption public 
goods and productive public goods respectively. In this framework, economic growth is driven 
by market-based civilian R&D as in standard R&D growth models and government-financed 
public goods (i.e. defense R&D) as in Barro (1990). We find that defense R&D has an inverted-
U-shape effect on growth, and the growth-maximizing level of defense R&D is increasing in the 
spillover effect and in the spin-off effect. Also, there is a welfare-maximizing level of defense 
R&D that is increasing in the security effect of national defense, and there exists a critical degree 
of this security effect below (above) which the welfare-maximizing level of defense R&D is 
below (above) the growth-maximizing level. 
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1. Introduction 
In the US, defense R&D as a percentage of GDP decreased from 1.29% in 1961 to 0.57% 
in 2008 (see Figure 1). This phenomenon has ignited economists’ interest in the effects of 
defense R&D on economic growth. For example, a recent empirical study by Goel et al. (2008) 
finds an interesting result that defense R&D has a positive and significant effect on growth in the 
US. While it is valuable to analyze the effects of defense R&D on growth, it is also important to 
consider the effects on social welfare. After all, growth maximization may not be equivalent to 
welfare maximization. To explore this issue, we develop a growth-theoretic framework to derive 
the different channels through which defense R&D affects economic growth and welfare. 
Specifically, we develop an R&D-based growth model that formalizes the commonly 
discussed crowding-out and spillover effects of defense R&D on civilian R&D.1 The crowding-
out effect refers to the case in which an increase in defense R&D reduces the factor inputs 
available for civilian R&D and hence has a negative effect on the growth of civilian technology. 
For example, Hartley (2006) notes that “[d]efence R&D has obvious opportunity costs through 
the use of scarce scientific personnel and assets that could be used on civilian research.” Also, 
Gullec and van Pottelsberghe (2003) analyze a group of OECD countries and find that defense 
R&D indeed has a crowding-out effect on civilian R&D. The spillover effect refers to the case in 
which defense R&D contributes to the performance of civilian R&D and hence has a positive 
effect on growth.2 For example, Chakrabarti and Anyanwu (1993) find that in the US, defense 
R&D has an indirect positive effect on the growth rate of civilian output through technological 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Cowan and Foray (1995) and Dunne and Braddon (2008) for a discussion. 
2 For example, James (2004, p. 37-38) suggests that defense R&D can affect civilian R&D via the following ways. 
First, defense R&D spending is partly devoted to the training of graduate students in science and engineering, 
thereby providing a favorable circumstance to foster civilian R&D talent. Second, defense R&D spending provides 
seed investment in new technology companies, and thus, can be viewed as a crucial source of early-stage seed 
funding for civilian technology companies. 
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change using the number of patents as a proxy, and they argue that this empirical finding 
supports the presence of a spillover effect from defense R&D to the civilian economy. 
In addition to the crowding-out and spillover effects of defense R&D, the growth model 
also features two important effects of defense technology (which is accumulated by investment 
in defense R&D). Firstly, higher defense technology improves national security and increases the 
utility of households resembling consumption public goods. For example, Hartley (2006) argues 
that “[d]efense R&D increases a nation’s military capability so improving its national security 
through using technology (quality) rather than increasing the quantity of arms.” Secondly, like 
productive public goods, defense technology improves aggregate productivity through the 
development of general-purpose technologies (GPTs) that have civil applications. This effect is 
referred to as the spin-off effect in the defense literature. For example, Ruttan (2006) argues that 
research in defense has played a very important role in the development of some major GPTs, 
such as (a) interchangeable parts and mass production, (b) military and commercial aircraft, (c) 
nuclear energy and electric power, (d) computers and semiconductors and (e) the internet. 
Within this framework, growth is driven by market-based civilian R&D as in standard 
R&D growth models and government-financed public goods (i.e. defense R&D) as in Barro 
(1990). We find that a fall in defense R&D has an ambiguous effect on the growth of output and 
consumption. In particular, starting at a high (low) level of defense R&D, reducing defense R&D 
has a positive (negative) effect on growth. Therefore, there exists a growth-maximizing level of 
defense R&D that is increasing in the spillover effect and in the spin-off effect. There also exists 
a welfare-maximizing level of defense R&D that is increasing in the security effect of national 
defense, and there is a critical degree of this security effect below (above) which the welfare-
maximizing level of defense R&D is below (above) the growth-maximizing level. 
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This study contributes to the literature on defense and economic growth by providing a 
tractable growth-theoretic framework that formalizes the commonly discussed crowding-out and 
spillover effects of defense R&D. To our knowledge, our study is the first attempt to model 
defense R&D within an innovation-driven growth model. Previous studies analyze the dynamic 
effects of defense spending either in an endowment economy or in a capital-accumulation-driven 
growth model.3 For example, Shieh et al. (2002) perform a similar growth-welfare analysis on 
defense spending in an AK growth model and find that the welfare-maximizing level of defense 
spending is always above the growth-maximizing level. Comparing the different results from 
Shieh et al. (2002) and the present study shows that the welfare effects of defense spending 
through capital accumulation and innovation are quite different. In Shieh et al. (2002), defense 
spending also serves as a proxy for national security and productive public goods that have a 
positive effect on output. In our model, defense R&D has the additional spillover and crowding-
out effects that are absent in Shieh et al. (2002). 
Our study also relates to the literature on productive government spending and economic 
growth initiated by Barro (1990). While Barro (1990) models public inputs as a flow variable, 
our study follows the more realistic formulation in Futagami et al. (1993) to model public inputs 
as a stock variable.4 The spin-off effect of defense technology gives rise to an extra channel of 
growth from productive public goods in addition to market-based civilian R&D. In addition to 
this spin-off effect, we also consider the role of defense technology as consumption public goods 
for enhancing national security as in Turnovsky (1996), Shieh et al. (2002) and others. 
The theoretical implications of our study rationalize the previous empirical results that 
find an ambiguous growth effect of defense spending and R&D. In an early study, Benoit (1973) 
                                                 
3 See, for example, Brito (1972), Deger and Sen (1983, 1984), Zou (1995), Chang et al. (1996, 2002), Shieh et al. 
(2002, 2007) and Aizenman and Glick (2006). 
4 See Irmen and Kuehnel (2008) for a recent survey on this literature. 
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finds that defense spending has a positive effect on growth in developing countries. However, 
upon surveying the follow-up studies, Ram (1995) concludes that defense spending has opposing 
effects on growth and the overall effect is ambiguous.5 Similarly, Lichtenberg (1995) finds that 
defense R&D has opposing effects on growth and the net effect is ambiguous. In contrast, Goel 
et al. (2008) finds that defense R&D has a positive and significant effect on growth in the US, 
and surprisingly, this effect is even stronger than private industrial R&D. 
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 
defines the equilibrium and analyzes the properties of the balanced-growth path. Section 4 
examines the growth and welfare effects of defense R&D. The final section concludes with some 
policy implications on the ongoing reduction in defense R&D. 
 
2. A Quality-Ladder Growth Model with Defense R&D 
We incorporate defense R&D into the Grossman-Helpman (1991) quality-ladder model. 
There are four effects of defense R&D in the model. Firstly, it has a positive spillover effect on 
civilian R&D. Secondly, it has a crowding-out effect on the factor inputs for civilian R&D and 
production. Thirdly, defense technology improves national security and has a positive effect on 
the utility of households as consumption public goods. Finally, like productive public goods, 
defense technology improves aggregate productivity through the spin-off effect. It is worth 
noting that defense R&D is a flow variable while defense technology is a stock variable. 
Although the quality-ladder model features only labor inputs, it is appropriate for our analysis 
because R&D scientists and engineers are the crucial inputs for innovation in civilian and 
                                                 
5 For example, Macnair et al. (1995), Brumm (1997) and Murdoch et al. (1997) find a positive relationship between 
defense spending and growth as in Benoit (1973) while Deger and Smith (1983), Faini et al. (1984) and Deger (1986) 
find a negative relationship. Also, some studies, such as Biswas and Ram (1986) and Huand and Mintz (1990, 1991), 
find an insignificant effect of defense spending on growth. 
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defense technologies. Given that the quality-ladder model has been well-studied, the familiar 
components of the model will be briefly described while the new features will be described in 
more details below. 
 
2.1. Households  
There is a unit continuum of identical households, who have a life-time utility function  
(1) ∫∞ − +=
0
)ln(ln. dtDCeU tt
t δρ , 
where 0>ρ  is the discount rate and tC  is the consumption of final goods. tD  is the level of 
defense technology and its law of motion is )( ,tdtt LfDD =&  with 0D  normalized to unity. The 
improvement of defense technology is increasing in defense R&D labor tdL ,  to be discussed later. 
As mentioned above, we follow previous studies to assume that households derive utility from 
national security for which the level of defense technology tD  serves as a proxy.
6 In other words, 
defense technology resembles consumption public goods, and 0≥δ  is a parameter that captures 
this security effect of defense technology. Households maximize utility subject to  
(2) tttttt TCWVRV −−+=& . 
tV  is the value of assets owned by households, and tR  is the real rate of return. Each household 
is endowed with one unit of labor to be allocated between production, civilian R&D and defense 
                                                 
6 This formulation captures Hartley’s (2006) argument (quoted in the Introduction) that higher defense technology 
improves a country’s ability in defending its national interests against the threat of foreign rivals and hence increases 
the utility of households. 
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R&D. The market wage rate is tW . The government levies a lump-sum tax tT  on the households 
to finance defense R&D.7 The familiar Euler equation is  
(3) ρ−= t
t
t R
C
C& . 
 
2.2. Final Goods 
Final goods tY  are produced by a standard Cobb-Douglas aggregator over a continuum of 
differentiated intermediates goods )(iX t  for ]1,0[∈i  given by  
(4) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= ∫1
0
)(lnexp diiXY tt . 
This sector is perfectly competitive, and the producers take the output and input prices as given.  
 
2.3. Intermediate Goods 
There is a unit continuum of industries indexed by ]1,0[∈i  producing the differentiated 
intermediate goods. In each industry i, there is a temporary monopolistic leader, who holds a 
patent on the latest invention and dominates the market until the next invention occurs. The 
production function for the leader in industry i is  
(5) )()( ,
)( iLDziX txt
in
t
t α= . 
)(, iL tx  is the number of production workers in industry i. As discussed in Ruttan (2006), defense 
technology tD  facilitates the development of GPTs and hence increases aggregate productivity 
like productive public goods in Barro (1990). )1,0(∈α  is a parameter that determines this spin-
                                                 
7 We focus on lump-sum tax to highlight the crowding-out effect of defense R&D. In the case of distortionary taxes, 
increasing defense R&D would unsurprisingly lead to other distortionary effects on the economy in addition to the 
crowding-out effect.  
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off effect of defense technology. As for technological progress from civilian R&D, 1>z  is the 
exogenous size of quality improvement from each invention, and )(int  is the number of 
inventions occurred in industry i as of time t. Given )(intz , the marginal cost of production for the 
leader in industry i is )/()( )( αt
in
tt DzWiMC t= . As is standard in the literature, the current and 
former industry leaders engage in Bertrand competition.8 The familiar profit-maximizing price 
for the current industry leader is a constant markup z  over the marginal cost given by  
(6) )()( . iMCziP tt = .9 
 
2.4. Civilian R&D 
Denote the value of an invention in industry i as )(~ iVt . Due to the Cobb-Douglas 
specification in (4), the amount of profit is the same across industries. As a result, tt ViV
~)(~ =  for 
]1,0[∈i . Because inventions are the only assets in the economy, their market value equals the 
value of assets owned by households (i.e. tt VV =~ ). The familiar no-arbitrage condition for tV  is  
(7) ttttxtt VVVR λ−+Π= &, . 
The left-hand side of (7) is the return on this asset. The right-hand side of (7) is the sum of (a) the 
monopolistic profit tx,Π  generated by this asset, (b) the potential capital gain tV&  and (c) the 
expected capital loss due to creative destruction for which tλ  is the aggregate Poisson arrival rate 
of inventions. 
                                                 
8 Grossman and Helpman (1991) show that in this model, an industry leader has no incentive to invest in her own 
industry, and hence, the next invention must come from another inventor. 
9 Li (2001) considers a CES production function. In this case, the monopolistic markup can be determined by either 
the quality step size or the elasticity of substitution depending on whether innovations are drastic or non-drastic. 
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There is a unit continuum of R&D entrepreneurs indexed by ]1,0[∈j , and they hire 
workers to create inventions. The expected profit for R&D entrepreneur j is 
(8) )()()( ,, jLWjVj trttttr −=Π λ . 
)(, jL tr  is the number of civilian R&D workers hired by entrepreneur j, and the arrival rate of 
inventions for entrepreneur j is )()( , jLj trtt ϕλ = , where tϕ  is the productivity of civilian R&D. 
Free entry leads to zero expected profit in the R&D sector and hence  
(9) ttt WV =ϕ . 
This condition determines the allocation of labor between civilian R&D and production. To 
formalize the spillover effect of defense R&D on civilian R&D, tϕ  is assumed to be increasing in 
defense R&D labor tdL , . For analytical tractability, we consider the following functional form 
(10) φϕϕ tdt L ,.= . 
This functional form is tractable because the spillover effects of defense R&D is captured by a 
single parameter )1,0(∈φ . When φ  equals zero, the R&D sector reduces to the setup in the 
Grossman-Helpman model in which the productivity of civilian R&D labor is solely determined 
by the parameter ϕ . 
  
2.5. Defense R&D 
Government invests in defense R&D to improve defense technology according to  
(11) )(/ ,, tdtttd LfDDg =≡ & . 
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tdg ,  is the growth rate of defense technology, and the function (.)f  satisfies the following 
regularity conditions 0)0( =f , 0>′f  for )1,0[, ∈tdL , 0)1( =′f  and 0≤′′f . The government’s 
balanced-budget condition is 
(12) tdtt LWT ,= . 
This setup can be interpreted as the case in which defense R&D is performed by the government 
and (11) is the government’s production function of defense technology. Alternatively, (12) can 
be viewed as cost-reimbursement contracts with defense firms. In this case, (.)f  is also affected 
by the incentives of defense firms in doing efficient R&D.10 Under either interpretation, a higher 
level of defense R&D increases the tax burden and reduces the supply of labor for production 
and civilian R&D (i.e. the crowding-out effect of defense R&D). 
 
3. Decentralized Equilibrium 
This section defines the equilibrium and characterizes the balanced-growth path. The 
equilibrium is a sequence of allocations ∞=0,,, }),(),(),(,,{ ttdtrtxttt LjLiLiXYC , a sequence of prices 
∞
=0)}(,,,{ ttttt iPVRW  and a sequence of tax policies 
∞
=0}{ ttT . Also, in each period,  
a. households choose }{ tC  to maximize utility subject to (2) taking },,{ ttt TRW  as given;  
b. competitive final-goods firms produce }{ tY  to maximize profit taking )}({ iPt  as given;  
c. the leader in industry ]1,0[∈i  produces )}({ iX t  and chooses )}(),({ , iLiP txt  to maximize 
profit according to the Bertrand competition and taking }{ tW  as given; 
d. R&D entrepreneur ]1,0[∈j  chooses )}({ , jL tr  to maximize the expected profit taking 
},{ tt VW  as given;  
                                                 
10 See, for example, Rogerson (1995) for a discussion on defense firms’ incentives under cost-based contracts. 
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e. the market for final goods clears such that tt YC = ; 
f. the labor market clears such that 1,,, =++ tdtrtx LLL ; 
g. the government balances its budget constraint such that tdtt LWT ,= . 
 
Lemma 1: Given a constant dL , the economy is on a unique and stable balanced-growth path.  
Proof: See Appendix A.□ 
 
Given that the economy is always on a balanced-growth path, we derive the steady-state 
equilibrium allocation of civilian R&D labor for a given dL . 
 
Lemma 2: The equilibrium allocation of civilian R&D labor is stationary and given by  
(13) φϕ
ρ
d
dr Lzz
zLL
.
1)1( −⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−= . 
Proof: See Appendix A.□  
 
The properties of rL  are quite intuitive. A larger markup z  increases the amount of monopolistic 
profit and the incentives for civilian R&D. Therefore, rL  is increasing in z . A larger discount 
rate decreases the present value of an invention. Therefore, rL  is decreasing in ρ . (13) shows 
that increasing defense R&D leads to contrasting effects on civilian R&D. On one hand, a larger 
dL  reduces the supply of labor in the market (i.e. the crowding-out effect) and hence decreases 
R&D labor. On the other hand, a larger dL  raises R&D productivity 
φϕϕ tdL ,.=  (i.e. the spillover 
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effect) and increases R&D labor. We assume ϕ  to be sufficiently large such that equilibrium 
R&D labor is non-negative. 
The Cobb-Douglas specification in (4) implies that each industry i employs an equal 
number of workers. Substituting (5) into (4) yields aggregate production function xttt LDZY
α= , 
where the aggregate level of civilian technology is defined as 
(14) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛≡ ∫∫ zdszdiinZ t stt lnexpln)(exp
0
1
0
λ , 
where the last equality uses the law of large numbers. Using (14), the balanced-growth rate of 
civilian technology is 
(15) zZZg ttz ln/ λ=≡ & , 
where rL.ϕλ =  is the aggregate arrival rate of inventions. 
 
4. Growth and Welfare Effects of Defense R&D 
This section firstly analyzes the growth effect of defense R&D labor that approximately 
equals defense R&D spending as a share of GDP.11 The balanced-growth rate of consumption 
denoted by ttttc YYCCg // && =≡  is  
(16) )(ln)1)(1( ... ddddzc Lfzz
zLLggg αρϕα
φ
+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−−=+= . 
(16) shows that economic growth is driven by zg  (i.e. market-based civilian R&D as in standard 
R&D growth models) and dg  (i.e. government-financed public goods as in Barro (1990)). 
 
                                                 
11 In the model, defense R&D as a share of GDP is given by ddxxddd LWLWLWLWLCWL ≈+Π+=+ )/()/( , 
where the approximation holds because rxx WLV ==+Π≈Π λλρλ )/( , where the last equality follows from (9). 
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Proposition 1: There exists a growth-maximizing level of defense R&D *dL  that is increasing in 
φ  (the spillover effect of defense R&D) and α  (the spin-off effect of defense technology). A 
decrease in defense R&D leads to (a) a positive effect on the growth rate of consumption if 
*
dd LL >  and (b) a negative effect if *dd LL < .  
Proof: See Appendix A.□ 
 
Proposition 1 suggests that the fall in defense R&D in the US should have an ambiguous 
effect on growth. This ambiguous effect arises from the opposing forces of the crowding-out 
effect versus the spillover effect and the spin-off effect. Therefore, the growth-maximizing 
defense R&D is increasing in φ  (i.e. the spillover effect of defense R&D) and α  (i.e. the spin-
off effect of defense technology). Figure 2 plots consumption growth as a function of dL . 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
We next evaluate the effects of defense R&D on social welfare. Imposing the balanced-
growth condition on (1) simplifies the lifetime utility of households to  
(17) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ++=⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ++⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ += ρρ
δ
ρ
α
ρρρ
δ
ρρ
ddz
x
dc gggLgDgCU .ln1lnln1 00 , 
where the last equality is obtained by normalizing the exogenous 0Z  and 0D  to one without loss 
of generality. We restrict the parameter space of ρϕ /  to ensure that U  is well-behaved and 
concave in dL .
12 Differentiating (17) with respect to dL  yields  
(18) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂+∂
∂+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂=∂
∂
d
d
d
d
d
z
d
x
xd L
g
L
g
L
g
L
L
LL
U
ρ
δαρ
ρ 11. . 
                                                 
12 See the proof of Proposition 2 in Appendix A. 
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The last term in (18) captures the positive effect of growth in defense technology on national 
security. The first term in (18) captures the negative crowding-out effect of defense R&D on 
production labor that results into a lower initial consumption xLC =0 . Combining (13) and the 
labor-market clearing condition yields  
(19) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−−−= φφ ϕ
ρ
ϕ
ρ
d
d
d
ddx L
L
zLzz
zLLL
..
111)1(1 , 
which is decreasing in dL . 
To derive the value of δ  at which the growth-maximizing and welfare-maximizing levels 
of defense R&D coincide, we firstly set (18) equal zero to derive the first-order condition for 
welfare maximization. Then, we substitute the growth-maximizing *dL  into this condition to set 
dddz LgLg ∂∂+∂∂ // .α  equal to zero. Finally, we rearrange terms to obtain 
(20) 0)(
*
* >⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
′∂
∂−≡
= dd LLxd
x
d fLL
LL ρδ . 
 
Proposition 2: The welfare-maximizing level of defense R&D is increasing in δ . Also, there 
exists a critical value δ  below (above) which the welfare-maximizing level is below (above) the 
growth-maximizing level, and δ  is increasing in the growth-maximizing level of defense R&D. 
Proof: See Appendix A.□ 
 
Proposition 2 shows that there is a welfare-maximizing level of defense R&D denoted by 
**
dL  that is increasing in δ , and there exists a critical value δ  below (above) which **dL  is below 
(above) the growth-maximizing level *dL  as illustrated in Figure 3. Intuitively, in addition to the 
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effects on consumption growth, defense R&D has the following two additional effects on welfare 
(a) a negative effect on initial consumption and (b) a positive effect on national security. If 
national security is not very important to households (i.e. δδ < ), then (a) dominates (b) such 
that the welfare-maximizing defense R&D is below the growth-maximizing level. Otherwise, (b) 
dominates (a) such that the opposite is true. Also, δ  is increasing in *dL .13 As dL  increases, 
xLC =0  decreases; consequently, the value of δ  at which *** dd LL =  must increase. 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper develops a simple R&D-based growth model to analyze the effects of defense 
R&D on economic growth and welfare. We find that the growth effect of defense R&D follows 
an inverted-U shape reflecting the opposing forces of the crowding-out effect versus the spillover 
effect and the spin-off effect. Also, whether or not the fall in defense R&D in the US should have 
improved growth (welfare) depends on the level of defense R&D in the economy relative to its 
growth-maximizing (welfare-maximizing) level, which in turn is determined by the spillover and 
spin-off effects (the security effect). We also find that the welfare-maximizing level of defense 
R&D can be above or below the growth-maximizing level. These theoretical results imply that 
even if defense R&D contributes to growth as suggested by recent empirical evidence, reducing 
defense R&D can still be consistent with either a positive or negative effect on social welfare. 
This finding suggests the importance of investigating beyond the growth effects when 
policymakers perform a cost-benefit analysis on reducing defense R&D. 
                                                 
13 It is worth noting that *dL  is an endogenous variable. In other words, the comparative static of 
*
dL  on δ  applies to 
underlying exogenous parameter changes (e.g. α ) that affect welfare only through consumption growth. 
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Finally, the canonical quality-ladder model is a first-generation R&D growth model that 
exhibits counterfactual scale effects (i.e. an economy that has a growing population experiences 
an increasing growth rate rather than a balanced-growth path). In our model, scale effects are 
eliminated by normalizing population size to unity. The literature has two other ways to remove 
scale effects (a) the semi-endogenous growth model and (b) the second-generation endogenous-
growth model that combines quality improvement and variety expansion.14 On one hand, Jones 
(1999) and Li (2000) provide theoretical support for the semi-endogenous growth model by 
showing that the second-generation model consists of two knife-edge parameter conditions. On 
the other hand, a number of empirical studies, such as Laincz and Peretto (2006) and Madsen 
(2008), tend to provide empirical support for the second-generation model and reject the semi-
endogenous growth model. Our simple model’s implication that devoting a larger share of labor 
to R&D would increase growth is consistent with the second-generation model. 
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Appendix A 
Proof of Lemma 1: Given a constant dL  (and hence a constant ϕ ), the labor-market clearing 
condition is trtxd LLL ,,1 +=− . Production labor-income share of final goods is zCLW ttxt /, =  
and the profit share of final goods is zzCttx /)1(, −=Π . The arrival rate of inventions is 
trt L ,.ϕλ = . The R&D zero-expected-profit condition is tt WV =ϕ . Substituting these conditions 
into trtxd LLL ,,1 +=−  yields  
(A1) zL tdt /)1( θϕλ −−= , 
where ttt VC /≡θ  is a transformed variable. The law of motion for tθ  is  
(A2) ρλθ
θ −−Π=−= t
t
tx
t
t
t
t
t
t
VV
V
C
C ,&&& , 
which uses (3) and (7). Substituting zzCttx /)1(, −=Π  and (A1) into (A2) yields  
(A3) ρϕθθ
θ −−−= )1( dt
t
t L
&
. 
The phase diagram for this simple differential equation is plotted in Figure 4. Figure 4 shows that 
tθ  must jump to its non-zero steady state given by ρϕθ +−= )1(* dL .□ 
 
Proof of Lemma 2: Imposing the balanced-growth condition on (7) yields  
(A4) )/(, λρ +Π= txtV . 
Substituting (A4), zzCttx /)1(, −=Π  and rL.ϕλ =  into ρϕθ +−= )1(* dL  yields (13).□  
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Proof of Proposition 1: Recall that )1,0(∈φ . Differentiating (16) with respect to dL  yields  
(A5) 0)(ln)1(1)1( . =′+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−=∂
∂
d
d
d
d
d
c Lf
z
zz
L
LL
L
g αϕφφ , 
(A6) 0)(ln)1(21)1( .12
2
<′′+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−−=∂
∂
− d
d
d
dd
c Lf
z
zz
L
L
LL
g αϕφφφ . 
(A6) shows that cg  is strictly concave in dL . Therefore, the solution to (A5) denoted by 
*
dL  is a 
global maximum. Also, *dL  is an interior solution because (a) 0/ >∂∂ dc Lg at 0=dL  and (b) 
0/ <∂∂ dc Lg  at 1=dL . Rearranging (A5) yields  
(A7) 0)(ln)1(1)1( . =′+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −− φαϕφ
d
d
d
d
L
Lf
z
zz
L
L . 
Because the LHS of (A7) is decreasing in dL  and increasing in α  and φ , *dL  is also increasing 
in α  and φ . Recall that ]1,0(∈dL  so that φdL  is weakly decreasing in φ .□ 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: We firstly characterize the first-order condition. From (16) and (19), we 
know that both xL  and cg  are independent of δ . Therefore, in (18), the marginal benefit of dL  
is increasing in δ  while the marginal cost of dL  is independent of δ . As a result, the welfare-
maximizing level of defense R&D **dL  must be increasing in δ . Also, 1** <dL  because at 1=dL , 
consumption equals zero (i.e. 00 == xLC ). At 0=δ , *** dd LL <  because 0/ <∂∂ dx LL  in (18). 
Let’s recall the definition of )( *dLδ  in (20). As δ  increases to δ , we have *** dd LL =  because 
0/ =∂∂ dLU  at *dd LL =  in this case. For δδ > , we have *** dd LL >  because 0/** >∂∂ δdL . Taking 
the log of (20) and then differentiating with respect to *dL  yields  
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(A8) 
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δ . 
The rest of the proof considers the concavity of U . In (17), ρ/cg  is concave in dL  from 
the proof of Proposition 1, and ρδ /)(. dLf  is weakly concave in dL . Therefore, if xLln  is also 
concave in dL , then U  must be concave in dL . Using (19), differentiating xLln  with respect to 
dL  twice yields  
(A9)    ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
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L , 
in which 0/ 22 >∂∂ dx LL  because 0>φ . Manipulating (A9) shows that 
(A10) ϕ
ρφφρ
ϕ φφφ +−+>+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛⇔<∂
∂ ++ )1()1(20ln )1(
)1(2
2
2
ddd
d
d
x LLLL
L
L . 
Therefore, there is a large enough ρϕ /  above which (A10) holds because the left-hand side is 
increasing in ρϕ /  while the right-hand side is decreasing in ρϕ / .□ 
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Figure 1: Federal R&D on national defense as a percentage of US GDP
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Data sources: (a) National Science Foundation, and (b) Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
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